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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIED MATERIALS COMPANY, 
et al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
vs. 
SALT LAKE, GARFIELD & WEST-
ERN RAILWAY CO. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8372 
Respondent is in general agreement with the state-
ment of facts contained in appellants' brief. However, 
certain facts appearing in the record are not referred to 
by appellants, which respondent deems to be of material 
significance, and further it differs with respect to the 
construction placed by the appellants upon certain other 
facts referred to. 
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Appellants refer to two deeds, executed in 1909, con-
tained in Exhibit 2, pages 23 and 24, which make specific 
reference to the respondent's right of way. It should be 
pointed out that the reference to this right of way shown 
by the deed on page 23 of Exhibit 2 is in this language: 
((* ~· * less, that portion of land awarded to 
the Saltair Beach Railroad Company (respondent's 
predecessor) for right of way, by decree of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Uta.h, and 
also less that portion of said land deeded to the 
Western Pacific Railway Company." 
In referring to this recital appellants characterize it 
as having been made by a stranger. Exhibit 2 shows that 
this grantor was a direct predecessor of appellants in the 
chain of title to this property, which fact respondent de-
sires to make certain this court shall be fully advised of. 
Appellants refer to the erection of respondent's track 
with pole line, trolley and guy wires as having occurred 
on an undetermined date. With respect to this point, it 
is pointed out that while the exact date of construction 
was not made a matter of record it is established by the 
testimony that this track with its poles, trolley and guy 
wires was in existence as early as 1924 which was over 
twenty-five years before appellants acquired their interest 
in the property. From that date until the time of trial 
the physical facts respecting the right of way have re- J 
mained substantially unchanged. (Exhibit 2, page 67, I 
R. 24-25) 
The foregoing statement is made with due regard to 
appellant's contention that defendant Allied Materials 
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3 
had no actual knowledge of respondent's claimed interest 
in the property prior to its purchase. It is admitted without 
dispute that Allied knew of the existence of the tracks, 
roadbed, poles, trolley and guy wires and that the same 
constituted a railroad line. (R 31) Of even more im-
portance, it also knew that these poles and wires were in-
side the boundaries of the property which it purchased. It 
is further conceded by appellants that Allied did not 
know to what point the respondent claimed its right of 
way extended and that it never did take the trouble to 
ask anyone concerning this vital point. (R 32, 55) Fur-
thermore, Allied did not know and could not discover 
from its cursory examination of the premises whether the 
poles and guy wires of the respondent were or were not 
located upon the railroad property. (R 29, 33) It was 
known, for instance, that at some points along the right 
of way the poles and guy wires were inside the fence lines 
of the adjoining property but at some other points these 
same appurtenances were outside such fence lines. (R 33, 
50-53) 
That Allied did have some concern in ascertaining 
the boundary lines of the property in question is evidenced 
by the fact that it had a survey made. (R 28, 29) It had 
the property abstracted and its attorneys made an exami-
nation of the title. (R 32) That abstract was admitted 
in evidence as Exhibit 2 and showed the two deeds dated 
in 1909 referred to which made specific reference to a 
railroad right of way affecting some portion of the prop-
erty. 
That Allied labored under some misgivings concern-
ing its south boundary is evidenced by the fact that it did 
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not take in the full measurement of the property surveyed 
but stopped eight feet north of that point. (R 24, 54, 55) 
Also, the fence of an adjoining owner on the west was 
located twelve or thirteen feet north of the line upon 
which Allied finally decided to construct its fence. (R 37) 
With this situation clearly before it Allied proceeded to 
erect its fence and to purchase the property and made no 
further inquiry to ascertain respondent's claims to the 
property in question. That such an inquiry would have 
been easy and would have warned Allied of the true situa-
tion is self-evident. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
APPELLANT, ALLIED MATERIALS COMPANY, 
HAD ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF 
FACTS WHICH REQUIRED IT TO MAKE REASON-
ABLE INQUIRY TO DETERMINE RESPONDENT'S 
INTEREST IN THE LAND IN DISPUTE AND HA V-
ING FAILED TO MAKE ANY INQUIRY APPEL-
LANTS ARE BOUND BY ALL THE FACTS WHICH 
REASONABLE INQUIRY WOULD HAVE DIS-
CLOSED. 
ARGUMENT 
Basically the record in this case raises but one sub-
stantial issue. Was the defendant, Allied Materials Com-
pany, at the time of purchase of the land in dispute on 
actual or constructive notice of facts or information that 
upon reasonable inquiry would have led said defendant 
to discover that respondent was the owner of said land? 
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We submit that the record requires a finding on this issue 
in the affirmative. The trial court so found and that find-
ing should be affirmed by this court. 
Certain facts which are undisputed stand out with 
crystal clarity. The first fact is that Allied had an ab-
stract of title to the land which it was buying. This 
abstract contained two deeds, executed by a predecessor 
in title, which specifically excepted from the land con-
veyed thereby certain land which had been awarded to 
the Saltair Beach Railroad Company for a right of way by 
court decree, and another parcel, not described as a right 
of way, but which had been deeded to another railroad. 
This abstract was examined by Allied's attorneys who had 
full knowledge of these recitals. Secondly, at the time of 
Allied's purchase the respondent was in possession and 
occupancy of the land referred to in said deeds as having 
been awarded to it, and had constructed thereon a pole 
line, trolley wires and guy wires. This physical evidence 
of occupancy was open to Allied and was known. In 
fact, the record shows that the guy wires were located 
fifteen feet inside the fence line which Allied built and 
the poles were eight feet north of the point which appel-
lants claim marks their south boundary according to the 
survey which they had had made. 
Allied knew that its land adjoined a railroad, it knew 
that the above mentioned facilities were on the land which 
it was buying and yet in spite of the warning of the recited 
facts in the abstract of title and the plain warning of the 
physical conditions which it saw and observed, no effort 
was made to determine the north line of the right of way. 
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No attempt was made to find the condemnation decree 
which Allied or its attorneys knew had been entered in the 
District Court in Salt Lake County and no inquiry was 
addressed to the railroad to find out what land the re-
spondent was claiming as its right of way or if the poles 
and guy wires were on the right of way. Later, when this 
controversy arose the condemnation decree was found in 
the clerk's office of the District Court of Salt Lake County 
which showed upon its face that the respondent was the 
owner of the land in question. Also, it cannot be denied 
that Allied could readily have learned the true facts and 
would have been advised of respondent's claims and title 
by merely taking the trouble to ask the respondent. 
Appellants seek to escape the consequences of Allied's 
failure to investigate further the deed reference to the 
decree awarded right of way upon the argument that to 
require Allied or its attorneys or abstracter to launch upon 
a search of the court records would be to impose upon it 
a burdensome task which it should not be penalized for 
not undertaking. 
Appellants brought an abstracter into court who 
testified that in about six hours he was able to find this 
condemnation decree. That it could have been found in 
the beginning by the expenditure of relatively trivial ef-
fort is apparent. Six hours of effort would have yielded 
the answer and respondent submits that this cannot be 
regarded as an unreasonable expenditure of time or effort 
to find the solution to this important question. Allied did 
not have to make this search itself, nor did its attorneys. 
They had at their disposal the experienced skill of an ab-
stracter. 
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It is inferred that the reference in the record was 
obscure, vague and uncertain; that following the recital 
in the 19 0 9 deeds no further reference was made in the 
chain of title to the right of way. The record actually 
contained a fund of information. In the first place, the 
deeds referred to the railroad which had been awarded the 
property, by name. Next, it excepted this right of way 
from the property described, which, all who saw it were 
bound to know, could be the very land which Allied was 
negotiating to purchase. Finally, the diligent searcher was 
advised of the county in which the award was made. 
Furthermore, the abstract did not disclose the Saltair 
Beach Railroad Company had ever conveyed or relin-
quished its right of way into the chain of title through 
which Allied had to claim in order to get a good title. For 
Allied to shut its eyes and refuse to ascertain the facts upon 
the flimsy ground that it could safely assume that the 
right of way did not affect its interest, we submit was not 
only unreasonable, it was negligent. No authority is cited 
by appellants which sustains the proposition that facts, 
such as we have here, which are brought to the attention 
of a buyer by a public record as well as physical surround-
ings, may be ignored. 
In O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770, 
this court adopted and approved the rule that whatever 
is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on 
his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to 
which such inquiry might lead. And further, that when 
a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he 
shall be deemed conversant of it. Wood v. Carpenter, 25 
L. Ed. 807. See also, Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 
236, 177 P. 763. 
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The rule is held to be applicable whether knowledge 
of the fact comes by actual or constructive notice. The 
effect of such notice is the same in either case. In the 
O'Reilly case, supra, purchasers who had been advised of 
the existence of a mortgage relied upon the grantor's as-
sertion that it had been paid. This court stated that they 
were bound to inquire of the mortgagee to learn if this 
was true. Not having done so they were not bona fide 
purchasers without notice. In that case, cited with ap-
proval, is the case of Taylor v. Mitchell, Kan. 48 P. 859, 
which involved an unrecorded mortage referred to in a 
deed which was recorded. It was held that the purchaser 
was bound by the knowledge obtained from the recorded 
deed and could not assume that it had been paid by the 
grantee, who, by a clause in the deed, assumed its payment. 
The purchaser was bound to ascertain as a fact if the mort-
gage had been paid by making inquiry of the mortgagee 
whose name was disclosed by the deed. 
In American Law of Property, Vol. 4, Chap. 11, Sec. 
17.11, 17.17 the author sets out that under several circum-
stances notice is imputed to a purchaser even though he 
has no actual knowledge or actual notice: 
((Where notice is thus construed to exist it is 
known as constructive notice. One form is ((in-
quiry notice." It exists when the circumstances 
are such that a purchaser is in possession of facts 
which would lead a reasonable man in his position 
to make an investigation that would advise him of 
the existence of prior unrecorded rights. He is said 
to have constructive notice of their existence 
whether he does or does not make the investigation. 
The authorities are unanimous in holding that he 
has notice of whatever the search would disclose." 
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This court has decided several cases holding that pos-
session is notice to a purchaser which requires him to in-
quire and determine the nature and extent of the right in 
the possessor: 
Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P. 2d 454 
Toland v. Coray, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 
Neponset Land and Livestock Company v. 
Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 P. 573 
Toland v. Coray, supra, further holds that possession 
is notice even without a showing that the person affected 
thereby knew of the possession. 
In Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526, 
this court considered the question of the effect of con-
structive notice created by matters of record. To this 
question the rule was also applied that whatever is notice 
enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard 
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which an 
inquiry might lead and such person will be held to be con-
versant of facts which could have been discovered upon 
inquiry. 
It is submitted that the matters presented by the rec-
ord in this case must be determined by the application of 
the rules announced in the foregoing authorities and that 
this case is not governed by the cases and authorities cited 
by appellants which are in conflict with these authorities. 
We desire to now comment upon certain arguments 
_in appellants' brief. 
It is conceded that the recital in the recorded deeds 
(Exhibit 2, pages 23 and 24), did not describe the re-
spondent's property by metes and bounds. It is submitted, 
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however, that in every other respect the recital was com-
plete. Appellants characterize the recital in said deeds as 
vague or ambiguous. What, may we ask, could be a plain-
er warning than a direct statement that part of the land 
described had been awarded to a specifically named railroad 
by a court decree and giving the name and title of the 
court where the award was entered? It was a simple, di-
rect and clear statement of the facts. The failure of sub-
sequent grantors to repeat this recital could have no bear-
ing whatsoever upon the effect of this notice. Nothing 
was shown in the abstract which indicated that any change 
had occurred in the title to this right of way. It was 
blind assumption on the part of Allied to presume that 
the land being purchased was not affected by this right of 
way mentioned in these deeds. 
Appellants further complain that the exception clause 
in the deed is indefinite in that one cannot tell with cer-
tainty whether the land excepted was part of Section 34, 
in which the disputed property is located, or in Section 3, 
in which section another portion of the respondent's right 
of way is located. With this contention respondent can-
not agree. 
An examination of the exception clause shows that 
it follows the parcel described as part of Section 34 and 
not Section 3. We submit that a fair construction of the 
language shows that the exception can have no relation 
to Section 3 at all. Even appellants concede that it could 
refer to either or both parcels. If this be true, then how, 
in good conscience, may they undertake to decide without 
inquiry and upon their own guess that it did not refer to 
the tract Allied was buying? If one could not be sure then 
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surely he would have some obligation to make certain. Any 
other course of action and the one which Allied elected to 
follow and rely upon is not the conduct of a reasonably 
prudent man. 
Next, appellants seize upon the point and argue that 
one may ignore the recitals of an exception clause in a 
deed to a large tract of land if subsequent deeds to smaller 
tracts carved from it omit or fail to make subsequent men-
tion of the exception. No authorities for any such proposi-
tion are cited to sustain this argument. The argument 
fails utterly to take into account the additional factor of 
the effect of the physical possession of respondent to give 
further impetus and stimulation to the necessity of an 
inquiry to ascertain the true facts. Not only did Allied 
have the plain warning of the recorded deed recitals but 
in addition the physical evidence was equally strong which 
any prudent person would not have ignored. 
Appellants appeal to the rule that one may not silently 
stand by and conceal his interest in property by failing to 
record and then step in and oust a bona fide purchaser. 
With the announced rule we have no quarrel but we take 
issue with the inference which would apply this rule to the 
appellants as entitled to its protection. The presence and 
possession of the respondent upon the ground was neither 
silence nor concealment. This possession spoke eloquently 
to the careful and prudent examiner of the property. It 
warned him that he should at least find out the nature of 
the claim by making reasonable inquiry. 
Appellants seek to escape the consequences of the 
notice conveyed by the physical facts by arguing that the 
nature of the possession was equivocal and equally consist-
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ent with merely an easement right. Analogies are referred 
to such as overhanging eaves, telephone and telegraph poles 
owned by utilities being commonly placed in private plots 
and which standing by themselves give no notice of a fee 
interest. We submit that the attempted analogy is un-
tenable. In the first place, it is common knowledge that 
railroad corporations invariably own the fee interest in 
their rights of way on their main lines and that they in-
variably construct their telegraph and other poles and sim-
ilar facilities upon their own property. Furthermore, the 
possession of the disputed ground by respondent was com-
plete. Respondent was not required to stand upon every 
square inch of the disputed property or to cover it com-
pletely by facilities in order to extend its actual possession 
to all parts thereof. 
To support their argument that respondent's poles, 
trolley and guy wires gave constructive notice only to the 
extent necessary to maintain such facilities and therefore 
Allied was justified in assuming that this possession con-
stituted a mere easement, the appellants cite certain cases. 
Respondent has examined those cases and does not concede 
that they announce the rule relied upon. For instance in 
Varwig v. Cleveland C. C. and St. L. Railroad Company, 
Ohio, 44 N.E. 92, the court merely held that no construc-
tive notice of possession of certain property arose because 
the railroad's tracks were adjacent to the land which the 
railroad claimed. In that case, on the land in dispute, the 
railroad did not have any improvements of any kind which 
would indicate that it was the owner or in possession of 
the land. Obviously, under such circumstances, notice of 
an interest or claim by actual possession could not be re-
lied upon to protect the railroad which had failed to have 
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the deed recorded. Furthermore, this case is contrary to 
the announced rule in this jurisdiction in the cases of 
Meagher v. Dean, supra, O'Reilley v. McLean, supra, To-
land v. Cora.y, supra, Lawley v. Hickenlooper, supra, and 
Neponset Land and Livestock Company v. Dixon, supra. 
It cannot be authority in this jurisdiction because it specifi-
cally holds that constructive notice in the absence of a 
record even though based upon actual knowledge cannot 
be substituted for a record under the Ohio statute. Utah 
has clearly rejected any such rule. 
So far as Chicago, R. I. and Pacific Railroad v. Welch, 
Neb. 118 N. W. 1116 and 1117 are concerned, it is to be 
observed that the railroad had not taken possession of and 
was not using the land for any of its purposes at the time 
the plaintiffs acquired their interest. Furthermore, the 
land was separated from the railroad track by a public 
highway. Naturally, since there was no notice of posses-
sion by use on the part of the company the subsequent 
purchaser could not be expected to make an inquiry to de-
termine if the railroad owned the property. 
It is only when facts are brought to the subsequent 
party's attention which put him upon notice and a duty to 
make inquiry that the rule claimed by the respondents has 
application. 
Two additional cases are cited on page 17 of appel-
lants' brief which are relied upon to support the proposi-
tion that pole lines are only notice of an easement. 
One of these cases is New York N.H. & H. Railroad 
Company v. Russell, Conn., 78 Atl. 324. This case does 
not sustain this proposition. It holds, on the other hand, 
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that the defendants were not bona :fide purchasers because 
when they purchased the land on which the pole line was 
located, it was then in existence and this fact constituted 
actual knowledge which required them to inquire as to 
the interest of the plaintiff, a power company. Having 
failed to make such inquiry of the owner of the pole line 
which probably would have resulted in defendants learn-
ing of the character, extent and ownership of the right of 
the power company, defendants were not bona fide pur-
chasers. An injunction against removal of the poles and 
wires was granted. 
The other case cited is Indianapolis and C. Traction 
Company v. Arlington Telephone Company, Ind., 95 N. E. 
280. This case likewise does not hold that a pole line is notice 
only to the extent of an easement right. It does hold that 
the existence of the pole placed the defendant on notice 
to inquire concerning the plaintiff's rights. In the par-
ticular case the plaintiff's only claim was that of an ease-
ment. The court did not have before it the question of 
the extent to which such a pole constituted notice of an 
interest in the land. Furthermore, the pole in question was 
a telephone pole-not a pole which was part of a trolley 
line located on a railroad right of way. 
Respondent relies upon both of these cases to sustain 
its position that from the knowledge which Allied had, 
both actual and constructive, it was under a dutyto make 
inquiry to determine the extent of respondent's owner-
ship in the land upon which was located its poles and wires. 
Appellants point out that all the difficulty here would 
have been avoided had respondent but recorded the con-
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demnation decree. With that the respondent must agree. 
On the other hand, all the difficulty would likewise have 
been avoided had Allied complied with its duty, equally as 
great as respondent's duty to record, to make reasonable, 
simple and proper inquiry to determine the extent of re-
spondent's interest in the property. 
Under Point III of their brief appellants assert that 
there is no competent evidence that respondent paid taxes 
upon the property in dispute. Certain it is that this prop-
erty was part of its right of way. Exhibit 3 admitted in 
evidence without objection shows without dispute that in 
assessing railroad property all property which does not ex-
tend beyond one hundred feet on each side of the center 
of its track is simply assessed as right of way without fur-
ther description being required or used and no metes and 
bounds description of such property is entered in the assess-
ment record. The exhibit further shows that from 1945 
to 1954 respondent made a return of its property to the 
State Tax Commission which showed 3.03 miles of main 
track located in the Salt Lake City taxing district. The 
property involved here is in such district. 
Exhibit 4 received in evidence without objection is 
the certificate of the Utah Savings and Trust Abstract 
Company certifying that the records of the Salt Lake 
City Treasurer's Office show the payment of taxes by the 
respondent to Salt Lake City Treasurer assessed by Salt 
Lake City for the years 1945 to 1954 inclusive. We sub-
mit that the finding of the trial court that the respondent 
paid the taxes on this land is amply supported by these 
exhibits. 
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CONCLUSION 
· ~1-{~n tJil undisputed facts contained in the record w~ . tfiat tlie~ellant, Allied Materials Company, purchased 
the land in dispute from its grantor in the face of facts 
both of record and by the possession of the respondent 
without inquiring to determine the extent of the respond-
ent's interest or its title to said land. This constituted a 
failure on the part of the appellant, Allied, to discharge 
the obligation imposed upon it by the law of his state and 
therefore, Allied was not a bona fide purchaser of this 
property and the judgment in favor of the respondent 
must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
